Israel’s targeted killing of Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah has not only caused a succession crisis for Hezbollah, but has also highlighted the problem of succession for the Islamic Republic of Iran. Coupled with the death of President Ebrahim Raisi in a helicopter crash earlier this year, Nasrallah’s assassination has scrambled the dynamics of the supreme leadership transition with an aging 85-year-old Ayatollah Ali Khamenei at the helm, and is likely the reason his son, Mojtaba Khamenei, a key figure in the Office of the Supreme Leader, has recently emerged from the shadows.
Iran’s decision to attack Israel for the second time this year by launching a salvo of nearly 200 ballistic missiles on Oct. 1 was likely driven by fears over the stability of Khamenei’s regime. Without such a response, the Islamic Republic’s survival might have been at risk. Iranian conservatives and those in the military establishment have become increasingly concerned over the loss of deterrence capability against Israel, which could result in difficulties in managing and recruiting for its Axis of Resistance. With Hamas weakened, Khamenei’s crown jewel Hezbollah severely degraded, and growing complaints among the Lebanese Shi’a community over Iran’s lack of protection, Tehran now faces one of its greatest security crises in decades.
This can be seen in public reporting on how Khamenei has become increasingly worried about security. Reuters indicated that he suggested that Nasrallah, before his death, decamp to Iran for safe harbor out of fears over Israeli infiltration. Though given the elimination of Hamas political leader Ismail Haniyeh in an Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) guesthouse in Tehran, the Islamic Republic is no longer the refuge it once was for its terrorist and criminal syndicates.
Iranian hardliners have even subtly criticized Hezbollah for not having a succession plan in place following Nasrallah’s death. Nasrallah was so important to the regime that some commentators went so far as to speculate that he could be a potential successor to Khamenei himself given his centrality in the Islamic Republic’s grand strategy. His death has thus magnified Tehran’s own woes, providing an opportunity for Khamenei to introduce Mojtaba to the public.
Mojtaba Khamenei’s public debut
Traditionally a behind-the-scenes figure, Mojtaba made his first public appearance in a video just last month. For decades, Mojtaba only on rare occasions was captured by official photographers, particularly during parades for Quds Day and the anniversary of the Islamic Revolution. He would also appear occasionally at funerals and memorials for key figures in the regime’s political elite.
But then, in late September, a mysterious video surfaced in which Mojtaba announced that he was suspending his seminary lectures on “Advanced Islamic Jurisprudence and Principles.” In the video, he insisted that “this has nothing to do with political matters and is an issue between me and God” and claimed that only two individuals knew of his decision to do so prior to going public.
Shortly after the demise of Nasrallah, Mojtaba was captured by Iranian media meeting in Tehran with Abdullah Safieddine, the brother of Hashem Safieddine, a potential successor as Hezbollah secretary-general who was reported killed by Israel on Oct. 8. Mojtaba was also separately photographed in a hospital visiting operatives from Hezbollah who were wounded in the exploding pager and radio attack by Israel, a visit he conducted with his brothers on behalf of his father. Then on Oct. 4, he appeared on live state television sitting in the audience with other members of the regime’s high command during his father’s Friday prayers sermon — the first such occasion since January 2020 where the supreme leader delivered personal remarks. Iranian media outlets like Tasnim News, which is affiliated with the IRGC, highlighted his presence there.
Mojtaba had not previously been photographed participating in such events. He was visible in public only sporadically and usually operated behind the scenes. His introduction mirrored the grooming of Raisi, who like Mojtaba was also thought to be a candidate to succeed Khamenei before he became president — especially when he visited Lebanon to meet with Hezbollah officials in 2018. Ditto for the late Mahmoud Hashemi Shahroudi, a former chief justice who was also considered a prime contender for the supreme leadership before he died in 2018, when he received publicity for a trip to Iraq in 2017. The heightened attention benefits Mojtaba by introducing him to the Islamic Republic’s core constituencies and raising his profile.
Prospects of Mojtaba Khamenei as supreme leader
It seems Ayatollah Khamenei may fear sharing Nasrallah’s destiny but has become more comfortable with the prospect of Mojtaba succeeding him as the next supreme leader when he passes away or is even killed. This may explain the uptick in Mojtaba’s public appearances in recent weeks. In the past, one of the main issues preventing Mojtaba from being chosen as the third supreme leader by the Assembly of Experts, a body consisting of 88 Shi’a jurists, was the concern over the appearance of nepotism. The concept of hereditary succession is not only contrary to the regime’s main doctrine (the Guardianship of the Jurist) but its elimination is one of the very reasons that the Islamic Revolution of 1979 occurred.
However, in the wake of Raisi’s death and the escalating conflict between Iran and Israel, it seems that for Khamenei and his supporters in the Assembly of Experts, the stability of the regime and the continuation of its ideological nature are much more important than the public perception of hereditary succession. Since the last Assembly of Experts election in March 2024, Khamenei’s handpicked allies have dominated the chamber, significantly increasing the likelihood of Mojtaba being chosen as his father’s successor.
Mojtaba has some qualifications to be named the next supreme leader: he is a radical cleric with an extensive political background but without the public exposure. He has managed Iran’s deep state, which consists of unelected bodies parallel to the state bureaucracy in the Office of the Supreme Leader, since the early 2000s. Additionally, he has been part of small but high-ranking decision-making committees for promoting and circulating the regime’s privileged class in both military and civilian organizations. Many in the current Islamic Republic nobility, including Hojatoleslam Mohammad Qomi, the head of the Islamic Development Organization, and Peyman Jebelli, the head of the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting, are confidantes of Mojtaba. In fact, Mojtaba for many years has created and run a network of such lieutenants, which some have dubbed the “Habib Circle,” to develop his own patronage system like his father’s.
Along the way, he has developed enemies. Therefore, there may be objections to Mojtaba succeeding his father from some factions that are resentful of his meddling in state affairs. Some voices in the Islamic Republic may also argue that he does not have the requisite religious credentials, for example not being an ayatollah, even though his father did not hold that rank when he became supreme leader in 1989.
Observers should also not discount the possibility of the system installing a placeholder supreme leader who is not a Khamenei relative, with Mojtaba pulling the strings behind the scenes. After all, Ali Khamenei, bearing in mind how ostracized his predecessor’s son, Ahmad Khomeini, became after his father died in 1989, will be concerned about ensuring his family’s well-being after his death.
There remain other potential candidates to replace Ali Khamenei aside from Mojtaba. They include Alireza Arafi, a member of the Guardian Council who leads Iran’s Seminary and is deputy chairman of the Assembly of Experts; firebrand cleric Ahmad Khatami, another member of the Guardian Council; and Mohammad-Mehdi Mirbagheri, who has been a member of the Assembly of Experts.
Hassan Khomeini, the grandson of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, has suggested that Iran should increase its military deterrence and potentially change its nuclear doctrine to allow for the production of nuclear weapons. This move could be an attempt to gain support from conservative factions within Tehran’s power structure after being sidelined from running for top positions. However, his chances of succeeding Khamenei are extremely unlikely because of how Khamenei has engineered the Assembly of Experts and his succession process.
Mojtaba Khamenei: A continuation of authoritarianism
Contrary to analysis by some observers who portray Mojtaba as a nascent modernist or reformist akin to young Middle East leaders like Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, he is unlikely to pursue a reformist agenda. His isolated upbringing, strong ties to extremist factions, and history of involvement in harsh crackdowns on protesters suggest that he will likely maintain, if not intensify, his father’s repressive policies. This is exactly why Khamenei prefers him to his other three sons — he sees himself in Mojtaba, a radical militant Islamist deeply immersed in military and security affairs. In this regard, Mojtaba is like Kim Jong Un in North Korea, who succeeded his father and continues his legacy of extremist policies.
The assassination of Nasrallah has not only destabilized Hezbollah but has also thrown Iran’s leadership succession into uncertainty. This situation may become even more acute if Israel decapitates powerful figures in Tehran as a part of its retaliation. With Raisi’s death and newfound publicity, Mojtaba’s stock is rising at a pivotal moment for Iran, its people, and the region. The regime’s focus on maintaining stability and ideological continuity suggests that Mojtaba will continue to rise and maintain the regime’s current trajectory of authoritarianism, with significant implications for Iran’s future and its regional influence.
Saeid Golkar is a senior advisor at United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI) and UC Foundation associate professor in the department of political science at the University of Tennessee at Chattanooga.
Jason M. Brodsky is the policy director of UANI and a non-resident scholar at the Middle East Institute.
Photo by Saeid Zareian/picture alliance via Getty Images
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